by Erik Szabó
The study was conducted before the assassination attempt against Donald Trump; therefore, this act of violence did not influence the outcome of the study. The writer condemns any act of violence committed from political or ideological deliberation.
It is safe to say that the 2016 U.S. presidential elections marked a turning point in American political history, as this was the year during which Donald Trump started his presidential cycle. His campaign and the presidency which resulted from that campaign were characterized by features of political rhetoric which to some extent were unprecedented in American political communication. Similarly to other populists, his agenda is heavily fixated on perpetuating an ideology which puts nationalistic ideologies as its cornerstone, focused on the strengthening of longstanding American values. However, in this process, he also created a discoursewhich is deeply exclusive towards ideas which do not fit into these perpetuated values. Even though he was not reelected in 2020, the 2024 elections are nearing at a rapid pace1, and it is becoming increasingly relevant to re-start the process of analyzing this discourse, to see who belongs and who does not belong in the American narrative according to one of the presidential candidates. The goal of this paper is aligned with this. It aims to explain the underlying techniques which are utilized by Trump in the process of creating a discourse that ‘others’ certain social groups, while exploring the idea that he employs this ‘othering’ to elicit unity from his supporters. Concurrently, the paper aims to explore the idea that all the categories that get ‘othered’ are in some way connected back to the Democratic Administration, thereby creating the biggest category of ‘others’ in Trump’s narrative.
Before the actual analysis of Trump’s discourse can begin, there are a few theoretical points which need to be examined. First, the phenomenon of ‘othering’ and its linguistic realization will be introduced. Secondly, ‘othering’ will be examined in the context of Trump’s rhetoric while focusing on the question of who is the ‘other’ for Trump – who does and who does not belong in the ‘ingroup’.
The concept of ‘othering’ is extensively documented within scholarly discourse. It originates from the human propensity to construct and delineate one’s own identity vis-à-vis the identities of others. “Othering are [sic] based on the notion that our ideas about who and what Others are (the characteristics assigned, the kind of life they are supposedly living) are closely linked to our ideas of who and what we are” (2013, p. 100), writes Bendixsen. In other words, the goal of this process is to determine with whom we share a common narrative of our culture and history, and who is “essentially different” (2013, p. 113). Naturally, this process of perpetuating cultural narratives of the ‘others’, who are different from ‘us’, often serves as the basis for the fabrication of hierarchical structures, as in the case of colonial and postcolonial discourses, but modern examples are abundant as well – exclusive immigration policies, racial profiling and gender discrimination are all prominent and frequently encountered cases of othering. These policies and narratives capitalize on the impression of unfamiliarity, which often elicits attitudes of fear and uncertainty from the members of the in-group, as they feel that their identity is endangered by consortiums from the outside (Dobrik, 2018). Whether this process of ‘othering’ is linguistic, institutional, spatial, or cultural, it appears to be universal that people from white, male and heterosexual groups fill the historically dominant positions – they are the ones who usually exclude others from structures of equality (Fought, 2006).
Rhetoric used by populists (including Donald Trump) frequently exhibits patterns of linguistic othering. “It prompts followers to emote—to express uninhibited feelings of fear, anger, and hatred” (2017, p. 708) argues Robert L. Ivie. Trump and other populist leaders are aware of the fact that modern society, and mainly the less educated, working-class portion of it, is plagued by something that Collier calls the “new anxieties” (2017, p.3). Betz terms this “the growing public pessimism” (1994, p. 41), referring to the notion that within these segments of society, there is a growing sense of being marginalized or excluded from the mainstream societal trajectory by the policymaking elite. This could mean the disappearance or underestimation of skilled jobs caused by globalism and technological development, the widening of the financial gap between those with and without an education, and the non-functionality of social safety networks, etc. “(…) Populists thrive on the anxieties created by the new rifts (…)” (2017, p. 6), argues Collier. These notions strongly entail Trump as well. Panayota Gounari writes, “Trump’s rise to power is not disconnected from the general strengthening of the extreme right, and the rise of neofascist leaders worldwide, as a larger percentage of the population now lives in conditions of ‘social malaise’ and experiences the consequences of immiseration capitalism” (2018, p. 208). The manifestation of Trump’s perceived resistance to entrenched elite interests is evident in numerous instances throughout his public appearances. Remarks such as “I love the poorly educated” and “I am draining the swamp in Washington” serve to underscore his stance against elitism. Essentially, he situates himself as the antidote to challenges stemming from what he characterizes as the globalist agendas perpetuated by the entrenched establishment in Washington. Consequently, Trump’s rhetoric emphasizes prioritizing domestic concerns, fostering employment opportunities, and instigating a broader rejuvenation of the working-class demographic.
On the other hand, the corrupt elites are not Trump’s only adversaries, as he engages in the process of demarcation of other social groupings as well. These clusters include ethnic minorities, immigrants, women, and those who advocate for their rights. For instance, occasional description of immigrants as “animals”, the labelling of Muslims living in America as a “problem”, making comments on women’s appearance such as calling them “fat pigs” and engaging in other methods of objectification, just to mention a few such examples, all strengthen the act of the aggressive rebel that he is performing in the public sphere. “Trump has created an ‘enemy’ category where he adds any group or individuals who threaten his political agenda” (2018, p. 210), writes Gounari, hinting at the fact that any cluster of persons can get labelled as the ‘other’ if Trump’s political goals call for such a demarcation.
The fact that the above-mentioned groups are the ones who are being marginalized and delineated from the framework of Trump’s ideal America implies that a cluster of people, who stand in contrast to those ostracized will form the ingroup. Presumably, these privileged social clusters will be native-born, white and probably of Christian origin – individuals from these demographic categories will constitute the ‘us’, who are juxtaposed with the outgroup which is attributed with negative connotations. The goal of this rhetoric, on the one hand, is to “appeal to the [anxieties of the] ‘common man/woman’, as to a quasi-homogenous people” (Wodak 2017, p. 5), while on the other “to draw his loyal followers together in perceived communality while excluding outgroups from those representing ‘we, the people’” (Nacos et.al. 2020, p. 3). Trump’s aggressive rhetoric finds its foundation in the demonization of certain groups and the attribution of the destabilization of the social fabric to these delineated demographics, while subsequently positioning himself as the remedy to these supposed instabilities. Moreover, this combative rhetoric is identified as fuel for anti-Semites and other racists, which makes it possible to appeal to an even wider electorate consisting of right-wing voters (Nacos et al. 2020).
These popular examples reveal the methods Trump uses to construct a discourse that marginalizes particular groups and identities, positioning them as incompatible with his agenda. While ostensibly he aims to ‘unite his followers’, in experience he exploits and capitalizes on the alleged anxieties of his voters. This is underscored by Carey: “on the contrary to ritual communication, the type of communication which builds actual bonds between interlocutors, populist politicians such as Trump are engaged in ‘rituals of excommunication’” (2007, p. 19). Trump has consistently employed his spoken and written language to continuously unite his devoted supporters under a perceived sense of communal identity, simultaneously excluding outgroups from the collective notion of ‘we, the people’. Therefore, his call for unity, in reality, is a call to arms, which aims to unite his voters against an adversity created by the outgroup, thus perpetuating a discourse heavily focused on the process of ‘othering’.
The data analyzed in this paper is derived from a recent campaign speech delivered by Donald Trump in Minnesota. The analytical method used to examine the process of othering was adapted from Dobrik (2018). Initially, the identification of the ingroup and the outgroup (the ‘other’) in Trump’s discourse was undertaken. According to Dobrik’s framework, the data was sorted into two subgroups: one representing the ‘other’ who, while differing in some ways, is still seen as acceptable within the narrative, and another representing the ‘other’ whose perceived divergence from the dominant agenda marks them as a potential threat to the ingroup. In essence, two types of ‘other’ were established: one that does not pose a threat to the ingroup’s agenda and narrative, and one that does. After establishing these two categories, individual linguistic devices that served the purpose of demarcation were meticulously scrutinized. This detailed analysis aimed to uncover the specific rhetorical strategies used to reinforce the boundaries between the ingroup and the ‘other’.
Even though the purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the rhetorical techniques Trump operates with to evoke contrasts which can serve as a basis of exclusion from his narrative, it needs to be established who constitutes the cluster from which the ingroup is composed from. This is a straightforward process, as Trump explicitly verbalizes it multiple times during the speech. Naturally, it involves local officials, who are labelled as “very good [people] (0:29; 2:13; 2:18; 3:19), the “hardworking patriots of the Heartland” (1:22) and in general the people who brand themselves as his supporters and voters of his.
On the other hand, Trump creates multiple categories of ‘others’ which obtain negative connotations and thus get labelled as hazardous for the stability of his narrative – in other words, unacceptable. One such cluster is Joe Biden, the Democratic Party, and their voters. This cluster of people gets attacked numerous times during the speech and thus constitutes a recurring topic of Trump’s narrative. Right at the beginning of his speech, Trump uses self-praise to contrast himself with Biden, highlighting Biden’s inability to solve problems Trump claims to have easily overcome. This sets a tone of ridicule and criticism towards Biden, which persists throughout the speech. Trump frequently attacks Biden by fixating on his shortcomings and associating him with negative outcomes, such as high inflation, energy costs, and taxes. He uses terms like “crooked Joe,” “worst president in history,” (5:24; 6:46, 58:00) and “destroyer of our country,” (18:29) to delineate Biden and his supporters as the unacceptable ‘other’ and thus exclude them from the agenda of the Republican party.
Subsequently, associations are created in connection to the assemblage of environmentalists, who becomes the second category of the unacceptable ‘other’. In this case, Trump problematizes a government consisting of Democrats wanting to make electric cars obligatory, which, according to him, goes against common sense, as fossil fuels are more effective. On the one hand, Trump creates this category of the ‘other’ by making fun of these environmentalists, while on the other he uses the phrasing “radical lunatics” (10:16) and “green new scam” (25:49) to describe the cluster which is advocating for the usage of renewable energies and their ideas proliferated by them respectively. By using this wording, Trump strongly demarcates this constellation of people while simultaneously implying that their policies are threatening the ‘American way of life’ and economic stability, thereby creating a category which needs to be rallied against.
The subsequent questions which Trump tries to problematize are the issues of illegal migration and trans people. Trump connects these topics to the malfunction of the Democratic government as well. He asks, “Why would they want an open border, (…) why do they want to have men playing in women’s sports” (28:51-29:02). Yet again, Trump presents these standpoints as if they were standing in contrast to common sense, pointing to the policies of the Democratic Party as irrational. Even though he ‘others’ transpeople by speaking satirically about them, the actual intention of ‘othering’ is directed at the Democratic Party – illegal migration and unfair conduct in sports2 are positioned as the negative outcomes connected with government by the Democratic Party. Even though Trump lists examples of why the transitioning of transpeople in sports is unfair (in a satiric way), he concludes this section by saying that the current president is “grossly incompetent” (31:12), thus connecting the cluster of illegal immigrants and transpeople back to the more influential ‘other’, the Democratic Party.3
Trump ‘others’ one more cluster of people – refugees from Palestine. The process of ‘othering’ is completed by multiple methods. For instance, Trump argues that the refugees are “poisoning our country” (49:39), while a few sentences later he compares them to snakes as he says “but basically, you take snakes and you’re going to get bit and we’re taking people that are people that other people don’t want” (50:05). Thus, it can be seen that Trump evokes many negative connotations in the span of just a few sentences, thus completing the process of demarcation. Naturally, through the usage of wordings and phrases discussed above, the possible negative outcomes of migration get associated with the Democratic Government.
On the other hand, Trump creates only two categories of ‘acceptable others’. The first one is the Mexican president. Trump says that “he’s a good guy, socialist, but that’s okay” (40:29), thus demonstrating that despite his negative attitude towards socialism (which has been declared on numerous instances throughout his career), he is able to create and uphold professional relationships with people who do not fit into the ideology proliferated by him. The second instance of ‘acceptable othering’ comes shortly after, as he declares that “I was the worst to Russia, but I got along with Putin… we got along, it’s nice to get along with somebody that has a nuclear capability right” (40:41-40:47). These sentences are supposed to show that when it is needed, Trump is capable of backgrounding his inhibitions – in case somebody has a nuclear weapon with the potential of being used against the United States, Trump is capable to ‘get along’ even with somebody from Russia.
Overall, two assumptions can be drawn from the analysis conducted above. On the one hand, during this rally in Minnesota Trump confined his speech to the framework outlined in the introduction: he mentioned migration, transpeople, and the ‘swamp’ in Washington, while concurrently augmenting some other issues into his narrative as well, e.g. the irrationality of environmentally friendly vehicles. The fact that based on the evoked negative connotations all these categories can be taxonomized as ‘unacceptable otherness’, while in contrast to this, there are only two instances of ‘acceptable otherness’, implies that Trump is indeed more engaged in a discourse which serves the purpose of congregating feelings of adversity in his followers, which yet again conforms to the ideas outlined in the commencement of the paper. The only cluster of people who belong to his ingroup is the “hardworking patriots”, while anyone who does not fall into that category is excluded and is used to generate fear and adversity in those who belong to the ingroup. Furthermore, the assumptions made at the beginning, namely that in most cases of othering the projected blame is put on the Democratic Party, were also shown to be true, as Trump almost always connects these ‘problematic groups’ to Biden and his administration.
This study analyzed the linguistic devices employed in Trump’s political discourse, focusing on how these tools are used to construct ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’. The findings reveal that Trump’s narrative is fundamentally exclusionary, relying heavily on radical opinions presented as ‘common sense’. By doing so, Trump draws a stark dividing line between his supporters, who are portrayed as possessing common sense, and those who do not support him. This deliberate polarization fosters a climate of ‘political othering’, where the opposition is marginalized and depicted as lacking rationality. It is crucial for voters to recognize and understand these instances of political othering. Failure to do so may result in an America that is deeply divided along lines of radicalized ideologies, eroding the social fabric and undermining democratic principles. Therefore, the ability to critically evaluate political rhetoric is essential to prevent the entrenchment of divisive and exclusionary ideologies within the national discourse.
Works Cited
Bendixsen, S. K. N. (2013). NEGOTIATING, RESISTING AND (RE)CONSTRUCTING OTHERING. In The Religious Identity of Young Muslim Women in Berlin: An Ethnographic Study (Vol. 14, pp. 108–146). Brill. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv4cbh33.8
Betz, H. G. (1994). Radical Right-Wing populism in Western Europe (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23547-6
Carey, J. W. (2007). Political ritual on television: Episodes in the history of shame, degradation, and excommunication. In E. Rothenbuhler & M. Coman (Eds.), Media, ritual and identity (pp. 42-70). Routledge.
CNN.com. (2018, June 21). President Trump Holds Rally in Minnesota. Retrieved August 6, 2024, from https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-rally-minnesota-06-20-18/index.html
Collier, P. (2018). The Future of Capitalism. Penguin Random House.
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Fought, Carmen. Language and Ethnicity. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Gounari, P. (2018). Authoritarianism, Discourse and Social Media: Trump as the ‘American Agitator.’ In J. Morelock (Ed.), Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism (Vol. 9, pp. 207–228). University of Westminster Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv9hvtcf.13
Ivie, R. L. (2017). Trump’s Unwitting Prophecy. Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 20(4), 707–718. https://doi.org/10.14321/rhetpublaffa.20.4.0707
Krzyzanowski, Michal & Wodak, Ruth. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe & USA: Contesting politics & discourse beyond ‘Orbanism’ and ‘Trumpism’. Journal of Language and Politics. 16. 10.1075/jlp.17042.krz.
Nacos, B. L., Shapiro, R. Y., & Bloch-Elkon, Y. (2020). Donald Trump: Aggressive Rhetoric and Political Violence. Perspectives on Terrorism, 14(5), 2–25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26940036
YouTube. (2024, May 18). Live: Donald Trump holds Maga Rally in Minnesota. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBhhe7yX8BE
- Editor’s note: although this study had been completed before the 2024 elections took place, there is no doubt that the findings remain more than relevant. ↩︎
- Trumps’ opinion, not the writer’s. ↩︎
- This happens multiple times in the speech, for example in timeframe of 42:24 – 43:31, this time on the issue of migration. ↩︎